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The Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act-An
"Alien Intruder in the House of Common Law"*
Alfred S. Pelaez**
Richard D. Gilardi***
On July 9, 1976, the Governor of Pennsylvania signed into law
Act No. 152' abolishing contributory negligence as an absolute defense to trespass actions and replacing that much maligned doctrine2 with a modified form of comparative negligence.3 The Act was
effective September 7, 1976, and by its express terms applied to "all
actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death
or injury to person or property .... "I
At the time Act No. 152 was signed into law Costa v. Lair was
pending in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,5 but
had not yet been tried.' Costa dealt with a motorcycle-car collision
* Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HAav. L. REv. 4, 13-15 (1936). See
text accompanying note 47 infra, for Justice Stone's complete quotation.
** Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.

Partner, Gilardi & Cooper, P.A., Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
1. Act of July 9, 1976, No. 152, 1976 Pa. Laws 855, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § § 2101, 2102
(Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
2. More than a quarter century ago Dean Prosser said: "The attack upon contributory
negligence has been founded upon the obvious injustice of a rule which visits the entire loss
caused by the fault of two parties on one of them alone, and that one the injured plaintiff,
least able to bear it, and quite possibly much less at fault than the defendant who goes scot
free. No one ever has succeeded in justifying that as a policy, and no one ever will." Prosser,
ComparativeNegligence, 51 MICH. L. Rev. 465, 469 (1953).
Other criticisms of the doctrine, both judicial and academic, are numerous and vitriolic.
See, for purposes of illustration, Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953), where
the Court referred to contributory negligence as a "discredited doctrine"; Li v. Yellow Cab
Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 812, 532 P.2d 1226, 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1975), where the court
said, "The basic objection to the doctrine-grounded in the primal concept that in a system
in which liability is based on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability-remains irresistible to reason and all intelligent notions of fairness."; and Keeton,
Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HAnv. L. REv. 463, 508-09 (1962).
3. The Pennsylvania Act does not provide for "pure" comparative negligence, which-as
is the case in maritime law-permits even a plaintiff who is 99% responsible for his injury to
recover the remaining 1% of his damages from a minimally negligent defendant. The Act
benefits only those plaintiffs whose negligence "was not greater than the casual negligence
PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought .
17, § 2101 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978).
4. Id.
5. No. G.D. 75-2200 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny County, Aug. 31, 1976).
6. Indeed, the case has not yet reached trial.
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that had occurred before passage of the Comparative Negligence
Act, and the defendant had asserted the plaintiff's alleged contributory negligence as a defense. Because it was unclear whether the
Comparative Negligence Act applied to such cases, we filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and/or a Motion for Declaratory Judgment on behalf of plaintiff Lawrence Costa, seeking a
ruling that the doctrine of comparative negligence applied to his
case. We contended that this should be so as a matter of statutory
construction and, alternatively, as a matter of common law even
should it be judicially determined that the statute does not apply
to cases pending but untried as of the Act's effective date. Both
arguments were found valid by Judge (now Justice) Larsen at the
trial level.7 Both were rejected by the superior court, which held that
contributory negligence should continue to apply to all causes of
action premised upon occurrences that took place prior to the Act's
effective date, regardless of when filed or tried.8
Biased as we are, we nonetheless accept the appellate court's
decision on the statutory construction issue as one upon which
reasonable people may differ.' We feel, however, that the issues
raised in the part of our brief dealing with the ability-indeed, the
duty-of the courts to incorporate the legislative policy into areas
of the common law beyond the statute's reach are of critical and farreaching importance, and should be further explored.
What follows is in large measure a portion of the brief we filed
with the superior court. The issues are, as a consequence, framed
around the doctrine of comparative negligence. The arguments are
not alone confined to that issue, however, and apply with equal force
to many other "settled" areas of the common law which are only
partially altered by legislative action. What frequently happens in
such instances is precisely what happened in Pennsylvania with the
legislative adoption of the doctrine of comparative negligence-the
legislation is silent as to whether it should apply to pending cases
and to cases that, although filed after the effective date of the legislation, are based on occurrences that predate the legislation. What,
if any, role should the legislation have in molding the common law
as it applies to the pre-Act cases?
7. Costa v. Lair, No. G.D. 75-2200 (Pa. C.P. Allegheny County, Aug. 31, 1976).
8. 241 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 363 A.2d 1313 (1976). A Petition for Allowance of Appeal to
the Supreme Court was denied.
9. For a discussion of the statutory interpretation is.sue, see 15 DuQ. L. Rsv. 531 (1977).
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To conclude that the Act's failure to reach pending cases precludes judicial tampering with the law applicable to those cases
may well result in a dual system of inconsistent laws for a considerable future time. That is the case with contributory negligence in
this commonwealth, and will continue to be the case for the foreseeable future. 0 It is not inconceivable that by now there exist jurors
who have been instructed in one case to permit a plaintiff to recover
even though he may have been 49% responsible for his own injury,
and who, in the very next case, were ordered to find against a plaintiff only a fraction of a percent responsible for his predicament. In
some instances this may be necessary. We doubt very strongly, however, that this should normally be the case, and can hardly condemn
such a juror should he give full approval to Scott Turow's observation: "'Legal thinking is nasty,' I said to Gina at one point in our
conversation, and I began to think later I'd hit on a substantial
truth.""
The arguments generally given to support the contention that the
legislative policy should not be applied to pending cases beyond the
statute's reach are that the matter is one beyond the court's common law competence; that retroactive application of the policy of
the act would deprive the defendant of a vested or otherwise protected right; and that the legislature, by virtue of the Act, has preempted the field. None of those arguments hold water in the area
of comparative negligence nor in many other areas where they have
been and can be raised. Yet, each contention was asserted by the
successful defendant in Costa v. Lair.
Initially, we were confronted with the argument that the venerability of the "contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery"
doctrine made it an appropriate vehicle for legislative change, and
that it should not be altered by judicial action. Were that so and
since the legislation does not apply to pending cases, those cases
would be forever frozen in a limbo-unentitled to the benefits of the
statute yet controlled by its narrow scope. Any judge-made doctrine
must be capable of judicial change should it be deemed of no present usefulness. And, it should not matter that legislation has nar10. The superior court's decision made the Act applicable only to causes of action arising
on or after September 7, 1976. Because of Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations, the
congested nature of its metropolitan courts, and the need to occasionally retry cases that have
been appealed, it is not inconceivable that jurors will be instructed to apply the doctrine of
contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery well into the next decade.
11. S. TURow, ONE L (1977).
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rowed the impact of the judicial error by correcting the law as to
future cases. As stated by Justice Eagen, "[Wlisdom should never
be rejected merely because it comes late."'" Nor, to paraphrase Justice Eagen, should wisdom be rejected merely because it will affect
a small number of litigants. Moreover, it is at least questionable
whether the pre-Act Pennsylvania Supreme -Court precedents that
contributory negligence acts as a complete bar to recovery can be
controlling in cases tried after the statutory enactment since the
judges in the prior cases considered the issue in the absence of the
public policy inherent in the legislation. Thus, a trial court or intermediate appellate court considering the issue of comparative negligence after the effective date of the legislation for application to a
case not within the scope'of that legislation is, in reality, considering
a case of first impression and-should not be absolutely bound by the
contrary pre-Act authorities.
It is our belief-and was Judge Larsen's conclusion-that the trial
court was not precluded from judicially creating a doctrine of comparative negligence applicable to cases outside the scope of the Act's
reach even though there was settled appellate court precedent to the
contrary. Since the common law of torts is a judicial interpretation
of the Commonwealth's policy as it relates to the allocation of responsibility for injury, the legislative intent articulated in the newly
enacted legislation cannot be ignored. Public policy as articulated
by the legislature is at least as important a consideration if not
actually a far more persuasive authority, than -the prior judicial
precedent. Thus, the principle of stare decisis did not preclude either the trial court or the intermediate appellate court from adopting a common law rule of comparative negligence applicable to cases
beyond the scope of the Comparative Negligence Act. 3 The conclu12. Gilbert v. Korvette's Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 612-13, 327 A.2d 94, 100 (1974).
13. For an enlightened statement of the role of stare decisis in our jurisprudence, see Ayala
v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584 603-06, 305 A.2d 877, 886-88 (1973) (citations
omitted):
Appellee urges that abrogation of the immunity doctrine disturbs the principle of
stare decisis.' It seems obvious, however, that appellee not only misconceives the mission of the stare decisis principle, but also ignores the admonition of Chief Justice
Cardozo: "We tend sometimes, in determining the growth of a principle or a precedent,
to treat it as if it represented the outcome of a quest for certainty. That is to mistake
its origin. Only in the rarest instances, if ever, was certainty either possible or expected. The principle or the 'precedent was the outcome of a quest for probabilities.
Principles and precedents, thus generated, carry throughout their lives the birthmarks
'of their origin. They are in truth provisional hypotheses, born in doubt and travail,'
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sion that pending cases should continue to be governed by the contributory negligence rule should only have resulted from a reasoned
reexamination of the problem in light of the legislative pronouncement, and from the conclusion that-the Act notwithstanding-public policy would be better served by a limited retention of
the doctrine during the transition period. No such policy-oriented
examination was made by the superior court. Moreover, we can
think of no conceivable reason, other than depriving a defendant of
a vested or some other right, that would lead to such a conclusion.
That contention is dealt with in a subsequent portion of this article
and is not believed to be meritorious.
The second argument with which we were met is that the judiciary lacks the power to implement any form of comparative negligence. An entire generation of scholars has rejected this thesis and
their conclusions have been echoed by virtually all courtsincluding those reluctant to make the change in the absence of legislative action-that have considered the matter. Perhaps the arguments in favor of judicial intervention to remedy the admittedly
unjust result occasioned by application of the contributory negligence concept are best summed up by Professor Fleming James.
In commenting upon Maki v. Frelk,i he argued that: "The proposition that changing the law is properly and exclusively the function
of the legislature runs counter to Anglo-American tradition. It has
long been the boast of the common law that it was able to adapt
itself to changing conditions."'" Professor James then noted that
courts have radically altered the entire face of tort law, eliminating
scores of previously existing defenses in the process; that the legislature has proved to be singularly ineffective in adapting tort law to
expressing the adjustment which commended itself at the moment between competing
possibilities."
.... "When precedent is examined in the light of modem reality and it is evident
that the reason for the precedent no longer exists, the abandonment of the precedent
is not a destruction of stare decisis but rather a fulfillment of its proper function.
"Stare decisis is not a confining phenomenon but rather a principle of law. And when
the application of this principle will not result in justice, it is evident that the doctrine
is not properly applicable."
The controlling principle which emerges . . . is clear-the doctrine of stare decisis
is not a vehicle for perpetuating error, but rather a legal concept which responds to
the demands of justice and, thus, permits the orderly growth processes of the law to
flourish.
14. 85 Ill.
App. 2d 439, 229 N.E.2d 284 (1967), rev'd, 40 Ill.
2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
15. James, Comments on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. Ray. 891, 892 (1968).
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changing conditions;"5 and that retention of the antiquated concept
of contributory negligence has resulted in jurors having to disregard
the law in order to effectuate just decisions. As to the latter fact,
and the disrespect for the law it engenders, he noted:
Jury lawlessness, like lawlessness in any form, has grave disadvantages. Though it may be the salvation of the law in some
circumstances, it does no credit to the law, and it does not
enhance the moral stature of the judiciary to persist in rules
that regularly call for salvation through lawlessness. Surely it
is a properfunction of the courts to preserve the integrity of the
judicialprocess. 7
Surely, the disrespect for the law and the invitation toward lawlessness engendered by the patently unfair doctrine of contributory
negligence will be enhanced when a juror may, in one case, be instructed to apply comparative negligence and in the very next case
16. This has been particularly true in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. See the statement of Mr. Justice Pomeroy dissenting in Laughner v. Allegheny County, 436 Pa. 572, 588,
261 A.2d 607, 615 (1970), that
the scattered victims of governmental negligence, are not a coherent or identifiable
group so situated that they might mobilize themselves and make their collective voice
heard in the legislature. In all probability, remedial legislation providing redress for
victims of governmental torts would not be retroactive so as to compensate for past
losses; hence there is little incentive on their part to press for such legislation.
In the more callous observation of Professor Potter: "[Tihere has never been a legislator
voted out of office for indifference to the plight of uncompensated victims of governmental
torts." Potter, Sovereign Immunity in Pennsylvania:An Open Letter to Mr. Justice Pomeroy,
38 U. Pirr. L. REv. 185, 193 (1976). What is true of victims of governmental torts is equally
true of tort victims generally.
17. James, Comments on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REv. 891, 896 (1968). In Li v. Yellow
Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 812, 532 P.2d 1226, 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863, the court said:
[Piractical experience with the application by juries of the doctrine of contributory
negligence has added its weight to analyses of its inherent shortcomings: "Every trial
lawyer is well aware that juries often do in fact allow recovery in cases of contributory
negligence, and that the compromise in the jury room does result in some diminution
of the damages because of the plaintiff's fault. But the process is at best a haphazard
and most unsatisfactory one." ...
It is manifest that this state of affairs, viewed from
the standpoint of the health and vitality of the legal process, can only detract from
public confidence in the ability of law and legal institutions to assign liability on a just
and consistent basis.
For similar authority, see Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HAav. L. REv.
463, 509, stating:
[Tihe rule of contributory neligence is so out of keeping with the prevailing thought
of the community that to a very considerable degree it has been vitiated by verdicts
that in effect apply a rule of apportionment in direct opposition to jury instructions-a
situation that promoted disrespect for law and legal institutions . ...
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in which he sits be told to completely bar a plaintiff from any
recovery whatsoever if the plaintiff's negligence contributed in the
slightest manner toward his injury. Rules of law, if they are to be
afforded respect, must be premised upon more rational bases than
mere form. And, acting to insure that respect for the law is pre8
served is a matter for the judiciary.'
The belief that the judiciary possesses the power to abrogate the
common-law doctrine of contributory negligence is not alone confined to legal scholars. More than a century ago the Georgia courts
fashioned a comparative negligence rule applicable to all plaintiffs
out of a statute applicable only to those injured as the result of
railroading operations.' 9 More recently, the courts of Florida, California, and Alaska have, without any legislative assistance, abrogated the doctrine of contributory negligence.20
The California and Florida decisions are particularly illuminating
since contributory negligence had been a part of the common law
of both states from their inceptions, and since both states had statutes incorporating the common law as the governing law in their
courts. Notwithstanding these impediments, neither court felt restrained from replacing the doctrine of contributory negligence with
the doctrine of comparative negligence. In disposing of the argument that the specific statutory incorporation of the doctrine of
contributory negligence into the statutory law made the matter one
properly within the exclusive province of the legislature, the California Supreme Court said:
We have concluded that the foregoing argument, in spite of its
superficial appeal, is fundamentally misguided. As we proceed
to point out and elaborate below, it was not the intention of the
Legislature in enacting section 1714 of the Civil Code, as well
as other sections of that code declarative of the common law,
to insulate the matters therein expressed from further judicial
development; rather it was the intention of the Legislature to
announce and formulate existing common law principles and
definitions for the purposes of orderly and concise presentation
and with a distinct view toward continuing judicial evolution.,
19. See Macon & W.R. Co. v. Winn, 26 Ga. 250 (1858); Flanders v. Meath, 27 Ga. 358
(1859). See also V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 1.5, at 17-29 (1974) (extensive
discussion of judicial adoption of comparative negligence).
20. See Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975).
21. 13 Cal. 3d at 815, 532 P.2d at 1333, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
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The Florida court circumvented the problem by noting that its more
general statute adopted the common law in force in 1776, and that,
as of that date, contributory negligence was probably not an articulated part of the common law. The court went out of its way to
observe, however, that even if the doctrine had been statutorily
incorporated into the law of Florida it remained subject to judicial
overruling because of its common law origins."
Without doubt, the doctrine of contributory negligence was originally, and yet remains, a creation of the common law, even when
for purposes of judicial and precedential continuity, the common
law has been statutorily adopted as the governing body of law to be
applied in constitutionally or legislatively created courts.2 While
the legislature may abrogate or change certain aspects of that law,
it cannot be said to have taken away the traditional powers of the
courts to change those laws to meet changing conditions.and demands without specific prohibitions aimed toward that end.
Bluntly, as the courts of Florida, California, and Alaska, as well as
virtually all commentators, have recognized, suspension of the judicial power-coupled with the ineffectiveness of legislatures in formulating a comprehensive statutory body of tort laws-would serve
only to suspend vital areas of the common law in another century,
where they would remain out of step and tune with modern society.
Wisely, as illustrated by the willingness of the courts to change such
"settled" tort defenses as governmental and charitable, immunity,
few courts have felt incapable of changing tort law, regardless of its
vintage, to meet current needs and problems.
The third argument against the judicial application of comparative negligence to pending cases is that it takes away from the defendants in those cases some "vested right. 2' 4 In disposing of this con22. 280 So. 2d 431, 435-36 (Fla. 1973).
23. Pennsylvania has a statute making consistent provisions of the English and Colonial
common law a part of the common law of this Commonwealth. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 152
(Purdon 1969). It has never been successfully contended, however, that the statute precludes
judicial alteration of the common law concepts in effect at the time of the statute's adoption.
24. The superior court, ignoring the fact that most overturned tort defenses have been
applied to the case in which the issue arose and also to cases pending but yet untried at that
time, emphasized that " '[retroactive legislation is so offensive to the Anglo Saxon sense of
justice that it is never favored.'" 241 Pa. Super. Ct. at 521, 362 A.2d at 1315. In a note, the
superior court said:
We do not wish this opinion to be construed as holding that there is a vested right
to the defense of contributory negligence. We hold solely that the retroactive application of the Act would affect the legal character of past actions in a substantive, rather
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tention, it should first be noted that the supreme courts of California, Alaska, and Florida considered this problem and concluded
that the newly applicable doctrine of comparative negligence should
be applied to all pending cases not yet tried. 5 Indeed, the Florida
court went so far as to make comparative negligence applicable to
cases on appeal at the time of the doctrine's judicial enactment
where the issue had been specifically preserved,"8 and the California
court ordered comparative negligence applied to cases then on appeal which for any reason were remanded for a new trial.Y In reaching the conclusion to apply the newly formed doctrine to pending
but not yet tried cases, the California court stressed that "determinations of this nature turn upon considerations of fairness and
public policy."' Obviously, none of the above courts felt that the
defendants in the pending but not yet tried cases had any "vested
right" or otherwise protected interest in the contributory negligence
defense. Other authority, both judicial and academic, buttresses
that conclusion and the conclusion that considerations of fairness
and public policy demand application of the doctrine to cases pending at the time it is judicially or legislatively concluded that the
concept of contributory negligence has outlived its usefulness and
thus detracts from, rather than adds to, our system of jurisprudence.
The "rights" which a tort defendant asserting contributory negligence claims are not property or contract rights-the kind that are
than a procedural, manner. Thus, we believe that a vested right and a substantive right
are not necessarily identical ....
Id. at 521 n.4, 362 A.2d at 1315 n.4. We are not persuaded that a substantive-procedural
dichotomy is any more valid, or any easier to apply, in the area of tort defenses than in the
area of ascertaining what law to apply in a federal court diversity case. The important criteria
in both instances is whether application of the rule of the case is outcome determinitive-which is no more or less true of the contributory negligence defense that was true of
the rejected defenses listed by the court in Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd.of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa.
584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). And, all of those outcome determinitive defenses were applied to
the case in which the issue was raised as well as to all cases then pending in the Commonwealth. Thus, regardless of nomenclature, the net result of the superior court's decision was
to give defendants a vested right to a defense existing before the effective date of the Comparative Negligence Act.
. 25. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 832, 532 P.2d 1226, 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858,
876 (1975); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 439-40 (Fla. 1973); Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d
1037, 1050 (Alaska 1975).
26. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
27. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
28. Id. at 832, 532 P.2d at 1244, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
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accorded respect when change is contemplated. As stated by the
Supreme Court of Washington in Godfrey v. State:29
[T]here is no vested right to a common law bar to recovery
that is provided by the affirmative defense of contributory negligence. . . .A defendant has no vested right in a tort defense,
the merits of which are not determined until a subsequent trial
and upon which he did not and could not have relied at the
time the accident happened . . . .Further, such a right does
not rise to any higher status by the mere passage of time.
A vested right, entitled to protection from legislation, must
be something more than a mere expectation based upon an
anticipated continuance of the existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, a demand, or legal exemption from a demand
30
by another.
Similarly, Professor James states that an immediate change to
comparative negligence "will disturb no fabric of custom, unsettle
no titles or property rights, and disappoint no reasonable expectations based on the common law rule."'3' In elaborating on this conclusion Professor James notes:
Only insurance companies could make any plausible claim "to
have made commitments and taken action in reliance" on the
existing rule . . . .But their rates are based on gross losses
rather than legal analysis, and the effect of change on such
losses will probably be minimal, since juries now apply the rule
3
under consideration and settlements are made on this basis. 1
33
Other scholars are in complete agreement.

29. 84 Wash. 2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975).
30. Id. at 962, 530 P.2d at 631-32 (emphasis supplied by court).
31. James, Comments on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. Rav. 891, 896 (1968).
32. Id.
33. See Wade, Comments on Maki v. Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REv. 938, 942 (1968), where the
author bluntly states, "In the field of tort law, there is no detrimental reliance on the rule
[of contributory negligence] as in commerical and property law," and Keeton, Comments
on Maki v Frelk, 21 VAND. L. REv. 906, 911 (1968), where the author, in arguing for a
completely retroactive application of a judicially created comparative negligence rule, states:
[Tihe reliance interests, on the basis of which it is argued that a fully retroactive
decision would be improper, seem to be outweighed by other factors in relation to this
specific rule that contributory fault bars. Added to the injustice of the rule, and its
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The courts of virtually all jurisdictions have in recent years radically overhauled and supplemented basic tort concepts, eliminating
in the process many previously existing defenses to tortious conduct.
In most instances the judicial decisions affected all pending but
untried cases. 3 ' In no instances have the courts believed that so
doing deprived any litigant of a vested or otherwise protected right.
There is no rational basis upon which the defense of contributory
negligence can be distinguished. No person acts negligently in reliance upon the fact that the person injured by that negligence may
himself be guilty of some small degree of negligent conduct and will
not be absolved by some mitigating doctrine, such as "last clear
chance." The anachronistic defense of contributory negligence is not
relied upon by anyone planning future actions, as is true of rights
secured by contract or property devices. It represents, at best, an
unanticipated windfall that far too frequently has served to exonerate a negligent party from the responsibility that he should logically
assume. Unanticipated windfall gains have never been deemed
"vested," or otherwise legally protected from judicial change
brought about by renewed or recently found judicial or legislative

wisdom .
The final argument that can be made against judicially formulatconsequent unfairness to all those whose claims it affects, adversely, is the fact that
the deviations from its application are widespread but lacking in evenhandedness.
That is, the unpoliced and unlawful apportionment of damages that occurs in many
jury awards today adds irregularity in its application to all the other injustices of the
present rule. If overruling is the answer, then outright, retroactive overruling-the kind
of overruling that was traditionally used in the few overruling decisions that occurred
more than a decade ago-is the kind more appropriate to this problem.
See also Keeton, Creative Continuity In the Law of Torts, 75 -HARv. L. Rav. 463, 508-09; Peck,
The Role of the Courts and Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 265,
304-308 (1963) (both arguing for judicially implemented retroactive application of the doctrine of comparative negligence).
34. See the long list of judicially altered tort principles discussed in Ayala v. Philadelphia
Bd. of Pub. Educ., 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 (1973). The highlighted decisions ranging from
the rejection of the rule imputing a driver's contributory negligence to an owner-passenger to
the adoption of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Tom § 402A, all permitted the plaintiff bringing suit
to recover and also permitted the plaintiffs with then pending cases to benefit from the
judicially decreed change in tort law. In no instance was the previously defense deemed to
have provided the tort feasor with a vested or otherwise protected right. See 453 Pa. at 60506, 305 A.2d at 888.
35. See Peterson v. City of Minneapolis, 285 Minn. 282, 173 N.W.2d 353 (1969), where
the Supreme Court of Minnesota said in a slightly different context: "'As of the time of the
accident a person did not have a vested right at common law to avoid paying for the consequences of his negligence merely because there were other tortfeasers involved.' "Id. at 290,
173 N.W.2d at 358.
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ing a doctrine of comparative negligence applicable to cases pending
but not yet tried on the effective date of the Comparative Negligence Act is that the legislature, by promulgation of that Act, preempted the field. That argument too fails to hold water.
The best that can be said for the pre-emption position is that the
Act makes no provision for cases pending before its effective date.
Clearly, the statute cannot be construed as in any way affirmatively
providing that, as to such cases, contributory negligence shall apply.
Failure to legislate in an area where the legislature is free to act does
not necessarily, nor even usually, indicate a legislative intent to preempt from the courts an area previously within their purview."
Perhaps the clearest analagous situation is found in Vincent v.
Pabst Brewing Co.- There, plaintiff contended that the Wisconsin
courts were free to adopt a rule of comparative negligence applicable
to those cases beyond the scope of the Wisconsin comparative negligence act-i. e., to all cases where the plaintiff's negligence exceeded
that of the defendant's negligence. These cases are beyond the scope
of the Wisconsin Act because that act, as does the Pennsylvania
Act, precludes any recovery where the plaintiff's negligence exceeds
that of the defendant, and is thus not a "pure" comparative negligence act.3 The Wisconsin court, over a vigorous dissent by its Chief
Justice, refused to judicially adopt a "pure comparative negligence
doctrine," and was content to continue barring any recovery by a
plaintiff whose negligence exceeded that of the defendant. But, a
majority of the justices agreed that the court had the power to
36. For analagous authority, see Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d
457 (1961). In dismissing the contention that piece-meal legislative abrogation of the doctrine
of governmental immunity precluded judicial intervention in areas beyond the scope of the
statutes, the court said:
We are not here faced with a situation in which the Legislature has adopted an established judicial interpretation by repeated re-enactment of a statute . . . .Nor are we
faced with a comprehensive legislative enactment designed to cover a field. What is
before us is a series of sporadic statutes, each operating on a separate area of governmental immunity where its evil was felt most. Defendant would have us say that
because the Legislature has removed governmental immunity in these areas we are
powerless to remove it in others. We read the statutes as meaning only what they say:
that in the areas indicated there shall be no governmental immunity. They leave to
the court whether it should adhere to its own rule of immunity in other areas.
Id. at 217, 359 P.2d at 461. The same reasoning seems to apply with equal force to the
Comparative Negligence Act which, by judicial interpretation, does not apply to pending
cases or to causes of action based on occurrences before its effective date. Costa v. Lair, 241
Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 363 A.2d 1313 (1976).
37. 47 Wis. 2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513 (1970).
38. See note 3 supra.
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implement this change, and that the Wisconsin Comparative Negligence Act promulgated some forty years before had by no means
pre-empted the field. Chief Justice Hallows, dissenting in a widely
praised opinion, summarized the beliefs of a majority of the court
that the judiciary had not been pre-empted when he said:
The history of this statute is clear that it was a.reaction against
the doctrine of contributory negligence but there is nothing in
its history or in its language which evinces any intent to preempt this field of common law to the exclusion of this court
... I think the argument against pre-emption can be based
upon an analogy to our action in Holytz v. Milwaukee . . .
where we abolished governmental immunity even though there
was a statutory enactment allowing recovery in a limited area.
I find no pre-emption based upon a negative inference of what
sec. 895.045, Stats., did not do. The doctrine of pre-emption
applied to common-law areas should rest only on affirmative
action; otherwise, the death of the common law is near at hand.
The doctrine of contributory negligence is a child of the common law and the court can and should replace it with the
39
doctrine of pure comparative negligence.
That reasoning, and the illustrations set forth therein, are equally
applicable to the Costa v. Lair' situation. And, if the Wisconsin
statute did not pre-empt even the field in which it operated-i.e.,
cases occurring after its effective date-it is inconceivable that the
Pennsylvania Comparative Negligence Act could have foreclosed
judicial entry into an area in which the statute was deemed to be
inoperative.
Nowhere, in either the language of the Pennsylvania Act nor in
its scanty legislative history is there any indication that the legislature intended to do anything other than abolish a doctrine universally condemned as being at odds with the fault concept upon which
our system of tort law is premised." Thus, the courts must be
deemed yet to possess the authority to extend that legislatively
recognized policy into areas beyond the statute's reach. This point
was cogently made by the Supreme Court of the United States in
39.
40.
41.

47 Wis. 2d at 135, 177 N.W.2d at 523.
241 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 363 A.2d 1313 (1976).
See note 2 supra..
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Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. 2 where it was held that the
courts had the power to judicially create a general maritime law
cause of action for wrongful death even though such a cause of
action had not previously been thought to exist and notwithstanding that Congress, in several separate enactments, had provided
wrongful death remedies for many persons within the admiralty
jurisdiction.4 3 In particular, the Court noted that the congressional
enactment of the Death on the High Seas Act-with which the
judicially created cause of action would in many instances work
concurrently in providing an alternative remedy-did not work to
preempt the judiciary from the field, stating:
To put it another way, the message of the Act is that it does
not by its own force abrogate available state remedies; no intention appears that the Act have the effect of foreclosing any
nonstatutory federal remedies that might be found appropriate
to effectuate the policies of general maritime law."
In short, pre-emption does not occur simply because there is legislation in the area. That legislation, or its legislative history, must
affirmatively indicate that the legislative policy will be thwarted by
judicial implementation or intervention. Where, as in the area of
comparative negligence, judicial action will in no way stultify the
legislative intent but will, instead, simply further carry out the
policies inherent in the legislation, there can be no claim of preemption. Indeed, as Moragne5 makes clear, far from being preempted, the policies inherent in the legislation may impose an affirmative duty upon the courts to further refine and implement the
legislation by judicial decision. As stated by the Moragne Court in
arguing that the legislative enactments may well impose an affirmative duty upon the courts to judicially expand the legislative policy:
These numerous and broadly applicable statutes, taken as a
whole, make it clear that there is no present public policy
against allowing recovery for wrongful death. The statutes evi42. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
43. See, for purposes of illustration, the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970)) and the Death
on the High Seas Act (46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970)) which had long enabled both "member of the
crew" seamen and those killed beyond a marine league of shore, respectively, to recover in
the admiralty for wrongfully imposed death.
44. 398 U.S. at 400.
45. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
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dence a wide rejection by the legislatures of whatever justifications may once have existed for a general refusal to allow such
recovery. This legislative establishment of policy carries significance beyond the particularscope of each of the statutes involved. The policy thus established has become itself a part of
our law, to be given its appropriateweight not only in matters
of statutory construction but also in those of decisional law
This appreciation of the broader role played by legislation in
the development of the law reflects the practices of commonlaw courts from the most ancient times. As Professor Landis
has said, " . . . It has always been the duty of the commonlaw court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies with the
inherited body of common-law principles-many of them deriving from earlier legislative exertions. ""
This common-sense recognition of statutory enactments as policy
determinations by our highest law-making bodies and, as such, a
consideration to be integrated into the common-law-which is itself
reflective of the policies by which all our actions must be gov46. 398 U.S. at 390-92 (emphasis added). See also the dissent of Justice Schaefer in
Sweney Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R.R., 42 Ill. 2d 265, 270, 247 N.E.2d
603, 606 (1969):
I agree that the statute as written violates the constitution, for the reasons stated in
the opinion of the majority. But I regard the enactment of the statute as an expression
of the public policy of the State which this court should respect, even though it cannot
be given complete effect according to its terms. That statute declares "void as against
public policy and wholly unenforceable" every exculpatory clause in any lease, business or residential, with the narrow and irrational exception in favor of particular
lessors and lessees of business property which totally defeats its major purpose. I would
hold that the statute, despite its invalidity, is an expression of public policy which fully
justifies this court in now holding, as a matter of common law, that exculpatory clauses
in leaseholds are void.
Reference is also made to Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-413
(1961), where the court, in overturning prior case law and judicially creating an implied
warranty of habitability said:
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safeplace statute, building codes and
health regulations, all impose certain duties on a property owner with respect to the
condition of his premises. Thus, the legislature has made a policy judgment-that it
is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property
owner-which has rendered the old common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule
of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent
with the current legislative policy concerning housing standards.
See also Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 16: 739

erned-was long ago recognized by Justice Stone when, in an address commemorating Harvard's Tercentenary Celebration, he said:
I can find in the history and principles of the common law no
adequate reason for our failure to treat a statute much more as
we treat a judicial precedent, as both a declaration and a
source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning. . . . Apart
from its command, the social policy and judgment, expressed
in legislation by the lawmaking agency which is supreme,
would seem to merit that judicial recognition which is freely
accorded to the like expression in judicial precedent.
. . . It is difficult to appraise the consequences of the perpetuation of incongruities and injustices in the law by this habit of
narrow construction of statutes and by the failure to recognize
that, as recognitions of social policy, they are as significant and
rightly as much a part of the law, as the rules declared by
judges ....
• . . A statute is not an alien intruder in the house of common
law, but a guest to be welcomed and made at home there as a
new and powerful aid in the accomplishment of its appointed
task of accommodating the law to social needs.'7
The policy inherent in the Comparative Negligence Act is clear.
No longer shall the unjust, unsound, and universally condemned
doctrine of contributory negligence be permitted to visit the entire
loss upon the least negligent of negligent parties. That policy, resulting from the deliberations of the Pennsylvania Senate and
House, is not aimed at only certain litigants, but is intended to
broadly apply throughout the entire field of torts. If the legislation
fails to completely accomplish that goal, and the courts are in a
position to further implement that policy to more fully effectuate
the broad legislative purpose, they should do so. Our integrated
system of judge-made and leglislatively-enacted laws cannot condone conflicting laws premised on contradictory policies.
Costa v. Lair, by permitting the common law to deviate from
legislative policy for what may well turn out to be the better part
of a decade, does violence to the goals espoused by Justice Stone and
Professor Landis, and adopted by the United States Supreme Court
47.
48.

Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HAv. L. Rzv. 4, 13-15 (1936).
241 Pa. Super. Ct. 517, 363 A.2d 1313 (1976).
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in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. 9 No court should have the
power to wreak such havoc upon a clearly articulated legislative
policy. Where a judicial decision seems patently to conflict with
legislative policy, it should be incumbent upon the court to clearly
show why its decision is in reality in accord with that policy. Only
when this becomes a standard judicial procedure can the doubts
expressed by Scott Turow5Obe laid to rest.
49.
50.

398 U.S. 375 (1970).
S. TUROW, ONE L. (1977). See note 11 and accompanying text supra.

